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1 Introduction
Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers seem to be becoming even more
prevalent in the supermarket industry, especially in food retailing. Competition analysis
and issues related to market power on some consumer goods markets should involve the
analysis of competition between producers but also between retailers and the whole struc-
ture of the industry. Consumer welfare may depend on these strategic vertical relation-
ships, in the form of linear or non-linear contracts between manufacturers and retailers.
The goal of this paper is to empirically estimate a structural model allowing linear pricing
and particularly non-linear contracts and to investigate the effects of policies that restrict
non linear vertical contracts among multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers. We
extend previous literature by not only allowing horizontal retail and horizontal manufac-
turer relationships but also explicitly considering alternative vertical strategic behaviors.
We do so by deriving and estimating models that allow for two part tariffs and/or resale
price maintenance between multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers in the form of
non linear vertical contracts.
Using retail scanner data on bottled water produced by manufacturers sold at retail
chains in France, we estimate a structural demand and supply model allowing for linear or
non linear pricing between manufacturers and retailers. Using price-cost margins recovered
from estimates of demand parameters both under linear pricing models and two part
tariffs contracts with or without resale price maintenance, and performing non- nested
tests among different supply models, we select the best supply model for this industry.
We find it to be the case that manufacturers use nonlinear contracts, in the form of two
part tariffs with resale price maintenance. We use the estimates of this model to obtain
brand-retail level marginal costs. We then perform simulations that restrict the use of
these vertical contracts and assess welfare effects under alternative counterfactual supply
side scenarios.
Our paper is the first paper to incorporate non-linear pricing into vertical contract
analysis. This is done under limited data on wholesale prices and fixed tariffs and it
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brings a new method for the empirical analysis of vertical contracts. Following previous
literature we estimate a demand model and derive implied price cost margins at the firm
level indirectly (as in Rosse, 1970, Bresnahan 1987, 1989, Berry, 1994, Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes, 1995, Nevo, 1998, 2000, 2001, Ivaldi and Verboven, 2005). A stream of re-
search followed, with papers allowing not only manufacturers but also retailers margins
to be recovered considering explicitly the strategic role of retailers: e.g., Goldberg and
Verboven (2001), Manuszak (2001), Mortimer (2008), Sudhir (2001), Berto Villas Boas
(2007), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), Hellerstein (2004), Asker (2004), Ho (2006), and
Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2006). Manuszak (2001) studies the impact of upstream
mergers on retail gasoline markets using a structural model allowing downstream prices
to be related to upstream mark-ups and wholesale prices chosen by upstream gasoline
refineries. Asker (2004) studies exclusive dealing in the beer market. Hellerstein (2004)
explains imperfect pass-through again in the beer market. Among the few papers that take
into account vertical relationships, Ho (2006) studies the welfare effects of vertical con-
tracting between hospitals and Health Maintenance Organizations in the US. Ho (2008)
studies how managed care health insurers restrict their enrollees’ choice of hospitals to
specific networks using the inequality framework of Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2006)
for identification. In the retail industry, Sudhir (2001) considers strategic interactions be-
tween manufacturers and a single retailer on a local market. These recent developments
introducing retailers’ strategic behavior mostly consider cases where competition between
producers and/or retailers remains under linear pricing leading to double marginalization.
Berto Villas-Boas (2007) extends Sudhir’s framework to multiple retailers and considers
the possibility that vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers make pricing
strategies depart from double marginalization by alternatively setting wholesale margins
or retail margins to zero.
While the strategic role of retailers has been emphasized as important in the mar-
kets (see e.g., Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi, 2003), and the papers above add a retail
horizontal layer in addition to a horizontal manufacturer layer in empirical analyses, no
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paper has yet considered empirically the analysis of the “vertical relationships” between
these multiple retailers and manufacturers. Our paper provides a first step towards the
analysis of the vertical contracts that may be occurring in the markets, allowing for non
linear contracts in the form of two part tariffs. Following Rey and Verge´ (2004) and ex-
tending it to multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers, two types of nonlinear pricing
relationships are considered, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part
tariff contracts and one where no resale price maintenance is allowed. Modelling explicitly
optimal two part tariff contracts (with or without resale price maintenance) allows total
price-cost margins as functions of demand parameters without observing wholesale prices
to be estimated. Using non-nested test procedures, it is shown how to test between the
different models using exogenous variables that shift the marginal costs of production and
distribution.
This methodology is applied to study the market for retailing bottled water in France.
This market shows a high degree of concentration both at the manufacturer and retailer
levels. It should be noted that this is actually even more concentrated at the manufacturer
level. Our empirical evidence suggests that, in the French bottled water market, man-
ufacturers and retailers use nonlinear pricing contracts and in particular two part tariff
contracts with resale price maintenance despite the fact that resale price maintenance is
forbidden in France. This is an important finding in view of the French regulatory environ-
ment for retailing. Actually, during the 1996-2006 years, resale-below-cost was forbidden
and defined in such a way that only unit price of invoices were used to define the threshold
for retail prices. This law could be easily manipulated by manufacturers who would pur-
posely display high wholesale prices providing a way to implement high retail prices for
manufacturers and this circumvent the ban of resale price maintenance. Finally it is also
shown how to simulate different counterfactual policies using a structural model as with
a de-merger between Perrier and Nestle´, a double marginalization case and a nonlinear
relationship between manufacturers and retailers without resale price maintenance. Our
results suggest that the merger case of Nestle´ and Perrier in 1992 would increase retail
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prices and the remove of the Gallant Act, simulated by the case where no RPM would be
used by manufacturers, would decrease retail prices.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, some stylized facts on the market for
bottled water in France are given, this being an industry where the questions of vertical
relationships and competition of manufacturers and retailers seem worth studying. Section
2 also present available data on this market. Section 3 describes the main methodological
contribution on the supply side. It is shown how price-cost margins can be recovered with
demand parameters when taking explicitly into account two part tariff contracts and/or
resale price maintenance. Section 4 discusses the demand model, its identification and the
estimation method proposed as well as the testing method between the different models.
Section 5 presents the empirical results for demand, price-cost margins and non-nested
tests and section 6 presents some policy simulations. A conclusion with future research
directions is in section 7, and some appendices follow in section 8.
2 Bottled Water Market in France and Description of Data
2.1 Stylized Facts on the Market for Bottled Water in France
The French market for bottled water is one of the more dynamic sectors of the French
food processing industry: the total production of bottled water increased by 4% in 2000,
and its revenues by 8%. Some 85% of French consumers drink bottled water, and over two
thirds of French bottled water drinkers drink it more than once a day, a proportion ex-
ceeded only in Germany. The French bottled water sector is highly concentrated, the three
main manufacturers (Nestle´, Danone, and Castel) sharing 90% of total production for the
sector. Moreover, given the scarcity of natural springs, entry onto the mineral or spring
water market is difficult. Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) comment on the Nestle´/Perrier
Merger case that took place in 1992 in Europe and point out that in addition to the high
concentration of the sector, these capacity constraints are a factor for collusion. The sector
can be divided in two major segments: mineral water and spring water. Natural mineral
water benefits from some properties favorable to health, which are officially recognized.
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Composition must be guaranteed as well as the consistency of a set of qualitative criteria:
mineral content, appearance, and taste. Mineral water can be marketed if it receives a
certification from the French Ministry of Health. Exploitation of a spring water source re-
quires only a license provided by the authorities (Prefectures) and approved from the local
health administration. Moreover, composition of the water is not required to be constant.
Differences between the quality requirements involved in certification of the two kinds of
bottled water may explain part of the substantial difference that exists between the shelf
prices of national mineral water brands and local spring water brands. Moreover, national
mineral water brands are highly advertised. Bottled water products mainly use two kinds
of differentiation. The first kind of differentiation stems from the mineral composition,
that is the mineral salts content, and the second from the brand image conveyed through
advertising. At present, thanks to data at the aggregate level (Agreste, 1999, 2000, 2002)
on food industries and the bottled water industry, it can be seen (see the following Table
1) that this industry uses much more advertising than other food industries. Friberg and
Ganslandt (2003) report an advertising to revenue ratio for the same industry in Sweden
of 6.8% over the 1998-2001 period. By comparison, the highest advertising to revenue
ratio in the US food processing industry corresponds to the ready-to-eat breakfast cereals
industry and stands at 10.8%. These figures may be interpreted as showing the significance
of horizontal differentiation of products for bottled water.
Year Bottled Water All Food Industries
Price Cost Margin Advertising/Revenue Price Cost Margin Advertising/Revenue
1998 17.38% 12.09% 6.32% 5.57%
1999 16.70% 14.91% 6.29% 6.81%
2000 13.61% 15.89% 3.40% 8.76%
Table 1: Aggregate Estimates of Margins and Advertising to Sales Ratios.
These aggregate data also allow us to obtain accounting price-cost margins1 defined
as value added2 (V A) minus payroll (PR) and advertising expenses (AD) divided by the
1The underlying assumptions in the definition of these price-cost margins are that the marginal cost is
constant and is equal to the average variable cost (see Liebowitz, 1982).
2Value added is defined as the value of shipments plus services rendered minus cost of materials, supplies
and containers, fuel, and purchased electrical energy.
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value of shipments (TR). As stressed by Nevo (2001), these accounting estimates can be
considered as an upper bound to the true price-cost margins.
Recently, degradation of the tap water distribution network has led to an increase
in bottled water consumption. This increase benefited the cheapest bottled water, that
is, local spring water. For instance, the total volume of local spring water sold in 2000
approached the total volume of mineral water sold the same year. Households buy bot-
tled water mostly in supermarkets, representing 80% of the total sales of bottled water.
Moreover, on average, these sales represent 1.7% of the total turnover of supermarkets,
the bottled water shelf being one of the most productive. French bottled water manufac-
turers thus mainly deal their brands through retail chains. These chains are also highly
concentrated, the market share of the top five accounting for 80.7% of total food product
sales. Moreover, over the last few years, as in other processed food products, these chains
have developed their own private labels3 to attract consumers. The increase in the number
of such private labels tends to be accompanied by a reduction in the market share of the
main national brands.
We thus face a relatively concentrated market where competition issues and evaluation
of markups are very important. In such market, it seems important to take into account
the possibility that nonlinear pricing may be used between manufacturers and retailers.
As a rule, two part tariffs are relatively simple contracts that may allow manufacturers to
benefit from their bargaining position in selling national brands.
2.2 Data and Variables
Our data were collected by the company TNS-WorldPanel and is representative of house-
holds’ consumption in France. It is a home-scan data set by nearly 11,000 French house-
holds for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, containing information on their purchases of all
food products. The data on all food purchases are obtained through home scan technique
and provide a description of the main characteristics of the goods and records the quantity,
3The Private Label (aldo named Store Brand or Own Brand in the UK) products encompass all mer-
chandis sold under a retailer’s brand. That brand can be the retailer’s own name or a name created
exclusively by that retailer. Retailers define characteristics of these brands and owns and controls them.
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the price, the date and the store for all purchases over the whole period, and in particular
on all bottled water purchased by these French households during the three years of study.
We consider purchases in the seven most important retailers that represent 70.7% of the
total purchases in the sample. The most important brands are taken into account, that
is, five national brands of mineral water, one national brand of spring water, one retailer
private label brand of mineral water and one retailer private label spring water. Purchases
of these eight brands represent 71.3% of the purchases for the seven retailers in our sample.
As will be shown in the demand estimation, robustness analysis is conducted in order to
assess whether this selection of the most important brands introduces significant bias in
the inference or not. The national brands are produced by three different manufacturers:
Danone, Nestle´ and Castel. This survey has the advantage of allowing market shares that
are representative of the national French market to be computed thanks to a weighting
procedure of the available household panel. Market shares are then defined by a weighted
sum of the purchases of each brand during each month divided by the total market size of
the respective month. The market share of the outside good is defined as the difference
between the total size of the market and the shares of the inside goods. Drinking water is
assumed to be consumed by all households of the panel. Thus, the outside good concerns
tap water used only for drinking purposes as well as still bottled water sold by retail stores
not considered in the analysis and still water from small manufacturers sold in the seven
retail stores studied. Considering that an individual has a mean drinking water consump-
tion of 1.76 liters per day or 53 liters per month (Gofti-Laroche et al., 2001), the total
size of the market can be computed by multiplying the monthly mean consumption by the
total number of individuals in our panel each year.
Eight brands sold in seven distributors were considered, which gives more than 50
differentiated products on this national market. A product is defined by its brand and
the retailer chain where it is sold. The number of products in our study thus varies
between 51 and 54 over the 3 years considered. Considering the monthly (periods of 4
weeks are used) market shares of all of these differentiated products, we get a total of
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2041 observations in our sample. Note that when computing the aggregate market share,
multiple choices and multiple purchases of households within each four-week period are
implicitly included, which is equivalent to considering these multiple choices as coming
from different purchase occasions in the random utility demand model considered. Then,
for each of these products, an average price can also be computed for each month (in
euros per liter). These data present both advantage and drawbacks. The advantage is
that reliable nationally representative data can be used rather than data from just a few
stores. The sample being quite large, it allows to compute monthly market shares and
monthly prices without too much missing information. In fact, as all brands are purchased
by some households at every retailer chain every month, the prices of all products are
consistently observed and it can be considered that all prices are observed in the choice
set of consumers for each period if prices were constant within that period. In practice,
the prices computed are average prices of purchase of the same brand in the same retailer
within the 4 weeks period and are based on average on 140 purchases per period. However,
prices do vary within the four-week period implying a possible aggregation bias. Table 2
below shows the variance decomposition of these purchase prices showing that 38.5% of
the variance of these prices is due to the within month variation of prices of brands in
the same retailer. This is of course relatively large. Thus, some robustness analysis with
respect to this potential variability of prices within periods is necessary. The observed
variance of prices within each month will be used to assess the robustness of estimation
of our demand model.
Analysis of Variance Partial Sum Degrees F P value
of price of Squares of freedom
Month 131.77 38 11.04 0.00
Brand 31789.76 7 14452 0.00
Retailer 213.71 6 113.35 0.00
Brand*Retailer 607.8 40 48.36 0.00
Brand*Month 1482.57 266 17.74 0.00
Retailer*Month 200.25 228 2.79 0.00
Brand*Retailer*Month 1473.55 1455 3.22 0.00
R2 0.614
Table 2: Analysis of variance of the price of each purchase
Table 2 also shows that the brand, retailer and time variation are all statistically
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significant in the analysis of variance of prices of household purchases. It appears that the
most important variation is the one across brands even if the time variation is important
and the retailer one too. The price obtained averaging by brand, retailer and month still
varies substantially across retailers and across periods for a given brand as shown by the
significant interaction effects of the retailer and month variables in the decomposition of
the variance of price in Table 3.
Table 3 presents some first descriptive statistics on the main variables used. We can
see that mineral water prices are twice larger than spring water prices and that we have
the same remark for market shares. The outside good is quite large since it represents
71% of the total size of the market.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max Nb. Obs.
Per Product Market share (all inside goods) 0.005 0.003 0.006 4.10−6 0.048 2041
Per Product Market share: Mineral Water 0.004 0.003 0.003 10−6 0.048 1496
Per Product Market share: Spring Water 0.010 0.007 0.010 10−5 0.024 545
Price in C=/liter 0.298 0.323 0.099 0.096 0.823 2041
Price in C=/liter: Mineral Water 0.346 0.343 0.060 0.128 0.823 1496
Price in C=/liter: Spring Water 0.169 0.157 0.059 0.096 0.276 545
Mineral water dummy (0/1) 0.73 1 0.44 0 1 2041
Market Share of the Outside Good 0.71 0.71 0.04 0.59 0.78 39
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Data from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)
were also used on the plastic price, on a wage salary index for France, on oil and diesel fuel
prices and on an index for packaging material cost. Over the time period considered (1998-
2000), the wage salary index always rose while the plastic price index first declined during
1998 and the beginning of 1999 before rising again and reaching the 1998 level at the end
of 2000. Concerning the diesel fuel price index, this shows quite significant volatility with
a first general decline during 1998 before a sharp increase until a new decline at the end
of 2000. Also, the packaging material cost index shows substantial variations with sharp
growth in 1998, a decline at the beginning of 1999 and again an appreciable growth until
the end of 2000.
The next section studies different alternative models of strategic relationships between
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multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers worthy of consideration.
3 Competition and Vertical Relationships Between Manu-
facturers and Retailers
Before presenting our demand model, modelling of competition and vertical relationships
between manufacturers and retailers is presented. Given the structure of the bottled water
industry and the retail industry in France, several oligopoly models with different vertical
relationships are considered. More precisely, using a particular game form (as in Rey and
Verge´ (2004) and Berto Villas-Boas (2007)) that will be detailed below, it is shown how
each supply model can be solved to obtain an expression for both the retailer’s and man-
ufacturer’s price-cost margins as a function of demand side parameters and the structure
of the industry. Then using estimates of a differentiated products demand model, these
price-cost margins can be estimated empirically and it will be shown how these competing
scenarios can be tested in the next section. A similar methodology has already been used
for double marginalization scenarios considered below by Sudhir (2001) or Brenkers and
Verboven (2006) or Berto Villas-Boas (2007) but none of the papers in this literature have
addressed the particular case of competition in two part tariffs using the recent theoretical
insights of Rey and Verge´ (2004).
Notations will be as follows. There are J differentiated products defined by the brand-
retailer couple corresponding to J ′ national brands and J−J ′ private labels. It is assumed
there are R retailers competing in the retail market and F manufacturers competing in
the wholesale market. Sr denotes the set of products sold by retailer r and Gf the set
of products produced by firm f . In the following we successively present the different
oligopoly models to be studied. Note that the set of products and their ownership will be
considered as being exogenous to our model, such that all ownership matrices defined are
exogenous. A next step in this research would be to endogenize the set of products, brand
ownership by manufacturers and the retailers choice of brand variety.
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3.1 Linear Pricing and Double Marginalization
In this model, the manufacturers set their prices first, and retailers follow, setting the retail
prices given the wholesale prices (we will use the term ”Stackelberg” for this assumption).
For private labels, prices are chosen by the retailer himself who acts as though owning
both manufacturing and retailing. Competition is considered a` la Nash-Bertrand at the
horizontal level. This vertical model is solved by backward induction considering the
retailer’s problem first. The profit Πr of retailer r in a given period (the time subscript t
is dropped for ease of presentation) is given by
Πr =
∑
j∈Sr
(pj − wj − cj)sj(p)M
where pj is the retail price of product j sold by retailer r, wj is the wholesale price paid
by retailer r for product j, cj is the retailer’s (constant) marginal cost of distribution for
product j, sj(p) is the market share of product j, p is the vector of all product’s retail
prices and M is the size of the market (including the outside good). Assuming that a
pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices exists and that equilibrium prices are
strictly positive, the price of any product j sold by retailer r must satisfy the first-order
conditions
sj +
∑
k∈Sr
(pk − wk − ck)∂sk
∂pj
= 0, for all j ∈ Sr. (1)
Note that for private labels, this price-cost margin is in fact the total price cost margin
pk − µk − ck which amounts to replacing the wholesale price wk by the marginal cost of
production µk in this formula.
Concerning the manufacturers’ behavior, it is also assumed that each of them max-
imizes profit choosing the wholesale prices wj of the product j he sells and given the
retailers’ response (1). The profit of manufacturer f is given by
Πf =
∑
j∈Gf
(wj − µj)sj(p(w))M
where µj is the manufacturer’s (constant) marginal cost of production of product j. As-
suming the existence of a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices
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between manufacturers, the first order conditions are
sj +
∑
k∈Gf
∑
l=1,..,J
(wk − µk)
∂sk
∂pl
∂pl
∂wj
= 0, for all j ∈ Gf . (2)
The derivatives of retail prices with respect to wholesale prices depend on the strategic
interactions between manufacturers and retailers and can be deduced from the total dif-
ferentiation of the retailer’s first order conditions (1) with respect to wholesale price, i.e.
for j ∈ Sr and k = 1, .., J ′
∑
l=1,..,J
∂sj(p)
∂pl
∂pl
∂wk
−1{k∈Sr}
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+
∑
l∈Sr
∂sl(p)
∂pj
∂pl
∂wk
+
∑
l∈Sr
(pl−wl−cl)
∑
s=1,..,J
∂2sl(p)
∂pj∂ps
∂ps
∂wk
= 0.
(3)
This expression derives from the assumption that manufacturers play first in the vertical
relationships with retailers. In the case where we assume that retailers and manufacturers
set their prices simultaneously, we can infer like Sudhir (2001) that only the direct effect of
wholesale price on retail price matter through the change in the marginal cost of products
for the retailer. Thus, the retailer’s cost of input is accounted for in the retailer’s choice of
margin. Both the manufacturer and retailer take the retail price as given and play a Nash
game in margins.
For retailers and for manufacturers, we thus obtain a system of equations (1) and
another system of equations (2) that can be solved (see appendix 8.2) to obtain the
expression of retail and wholesale margins of all products, respectively, as a function
of demand parameters and of the structure of the industry.
3.2 Two-Part Tariffs
The case is now considered where manufacturers and retailers sign two-part tariff contracts
in a particular game form. Rey and Verge´ (2004) prove the existence of and characterize
equilibria under some conditions on elasticities of demand and the shape of profit function
to a (double) common agency game in a two manufacturer - two retailer version4. It
4These technical assumptions require that direct price effects dominate in demand elasticities such that
if all prices increase, demand decreases. The empirical estimation of demand will confirm that this is the
case for bottled water in France. Moreover, the monopoly profit function of the industry has to be single
peaked as well as manufacturers revenue functions of the wholesale price vector.
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is assumed that manufacturers simultaneously propose take-it or leave-it offers of two-
part tariff contracts to each retailer. These contracts are public information and involve
specifying franchise fees and wholesale prices but also retail prices in the case where
manufacturers can use resale price maintenance. If one offer is rejected, then all contracts
are refused5. If all offers are accepted, the retailers simultaneously set their retail prices
and contracts are implemented.
The fact that manufacturers make offers and that once an offer is rejected no contract
is signed puts retailers at their participation constraint, i.e. their profit should be equal to
the minimum profit that the retailer can obtain if all contracts on this market are rejected.
This outside option of the retailers is assumed to be given exogenously. Endogenizing the
outside option is left for future research and is outside the scope of the present paper. It
has to be noted that this theoretical model implies that the true profits of manufacturers
and retailers are not identified since the reservation utilities can shift rents between parties
without changing equilibria. Another remark consists in the fact that allowing retailers
to make offers first would shift rents from the manufacturer to the retailer but the set
of price equilibria would be defined by the same sets of first order conditions. Moreover
assuming that the offers of manufacturers are public is a convenient modelling hypothesis
that can be justified in France by the non-discrimination laws coming from the 1986 edict
on free price setting6 which prevent in principle to offer different prices to purchasers who
provide comparable services.
In the case of these two part tariff contracts, the profit function of retailer r is:
Πr =
∑
j∈Sr
[M(pj − wj − cj)sj(p)− Fj ] (4)
where Fj is the franchise fee paid by the retailer for selling product j.
Manufacturers set their wholesale prices wk and the franchise fees Fk in order to
5The characterization of equilibria in the opposite case is more difficult (Rey and Verge´, 2004). However,
this assumption means that all manufacturers trading with all retailers should be observed, which is the
case for bottled water in France.
6From 1986, restrictive pricing practices such as resale price maintenance, below-cost prices or discrim-
inatory pricing were prohibited. In 1996, the Galland law, strengthened penalties against resale at loss
(below-cost prices) by defining clearly the threshold as the net invoice unit price set by suppliers. Back-
room margins which gather diverse fees such as slotting allowances, deferred price reductions or payment
for commercial services obtained by retailers could not be included in the resale-below-cost threshold.
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maximize profits equal to
Πf =
∑
k∈Gf
[M(wk − µk)sk(p) + Fk] (5)
for firm f , subject to retailers’ participation constraints Πr ≥ Πr, for all r = 1, .., R, where
Πr is the outside option of retailer r, supposed exogenous.
As shown in Rey and Verge´ (2004), participation constraints are binding since otherwise
manufacturers could increase the fixed fees Fk given those of other manufacturers. The
expressions for the franchise fee Fk of the binding participation constraint can be sub-
stituted into the manufacturer’s profit (5) to obtain the following profit for firm f (see
details in appendix 8.1 where reservation utilities Πr are simply a constant to be added
and that can be normalized to zero):
Πf =
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
∑
k 6∈Gf
(pk − wk − ck)sk(p)−
∑
j 6∈Gf
Fj (6)
This shows that each manufacturer fully internalizes the entire margins on his products
but internalizes only the retail margins on rivals’ products. Note that the additional term∑
j 6∈Gf
Fj is constant for the manufacturer f and thus maximizing the profits of f is equiv-
alent to maximizing the sum (6) without this term. Furthermore, maximization of this
objective function depends on whether resale price maintenance is used or not by manu-
facturers.
Note that even if we assume publicly observable contracts and if retail price main-
tenance is illegal in France, it is nevertheless interesting to consider such an equilibrium
since antitrust authorities may fail to enforce these regulatory constraints, or because it
could be obtained by other means through more complicated nonlinear contracts (with
more than two parts) without explicit RPM. We then consider two cases for this two part
tariffs contracts: one where resale price maintenance is allowed and one where resale price
maintenance is forbidden.
3.2.1 Two part tariffs with resale price maintenance
Consider the case where manufacturers can use resale price maintenance. Rey and Verge´
(2004) show that it is always a dominant strategy for manufacturers to set retail prices
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in their contracting relationship with retailers, which is intuitive since by choosing retail
prices and wholesale prices the manufacturer can at least replicate the equilibrium obtained
by letting retailers fix their prices given wholesale prices and sometimes do better.
Since manufacturers can capture retail profits through franchise fees and also set retail
prices, wholesale prices have no direct effect on profit. The profit expression (6) shows
that using RPM, the manufacturer’s choice of wholesale prices for its own products does
not affect its profit but that the wholesale prices of other products chosen by other man-
ufacturers affect its own profit. This is why wholesale prices have a strategic role for
each manufacturer because they do not affect their own profit but affect the ones of other
manufacturers and thus affect their strategic choices of retail prices (through the fact that
they affect market shares of all products).
Manufacturers have more control variables than needed and Rey and Verge´ (2004)
showed that this generates multiple equilibria (a continuum), with one for each wholesale
prices vector that influence the strategic behavior of competitors. Thus, for each wholesale
price vector w∗, there exists a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium7 in which retailers
earn zero profit and manufacturers set retail prices to p∗(w∗), where p∗(w∗) is a decreasing
function of w∗ equal to the monopoly price when the wholesale prices are equal to the
marginal cost of production.
Moreover, equation (6) also shows that, if there was not private label products that will
treat specially later, when wholesale prices are equal to the marginal cost of production,
then the two part tariffs contracts allow to maximize the full profits of the integrated
industry.
For a given equilibrium p∗(w∗), the program of manufacturer f is now
max
{pk}∈Gf
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
∑
k 6∈Gf
(p∗k − w∗k − ck)sk(p)
Thus, we can write the first order conditions for this program as
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) +
∑
k 6∈Gf
(p∗k − w∗k − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ Gf (7)
7Rey and Verge´ (2004) prove the existence of symmetric equilibria with two symmetric manufacturers
and two symmetric retailers.
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Then, depending on the wholesale prices, assuming that the first order conditions are
sufficient (Rey and Verge´ (2004) give examples of conditions on profit functions that will
insure that it is the case), several equilibria can be considered.
First, we consider the case where wholesale prices are equal to the marginal cost of
production (w∗k = µk). In this case, retailers act as residual claimants and manufacturers
capture the full monopoly rents through fixed fees. The first order conditions (7) can be
expressed
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) +
∑
k 6∈Gf
(p∗k − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ Gf
i.e.
J∑
k=1
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ Gf (8)
In the case of private label products, retailers choose retail prices and bear the marginal
cost of production and distribution, maximizing:
max
{pj}j∈S˜r
∑
k∈Sr
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p)
where S˜r is the set of private label products of retailer r. Thus, for private label products,
additional equations are obtained from the first order conditions of the profit maximization
of retailers that both produce and retail these products. The first order conditions give
∑
k∈Sr
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ S˜r (9)
We thus obtain a system of equations with (8) and (9) that can be solved (see appendix
8.2), to obtain the expression for the total price-cost margin of all products as a function
of demand parameters and of the structure of the industry.
Note that in the absence of private label products, the expression obtained and that
solves this system simplifies to the case where the total profits of the integrated industry.
This shows that two part tariff contracts with RPM allow manufacturers to maximize the
full profits of the integrated industry if retailers have no private label products.
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Second, we consider the case where wholesale prices are such that the retailer’s price
cost margins are zero (p∗k(w
∗
k) − w∗k − ck = 0). This case is considered by Berto Villas-
Boas (2007) and implies that retail prices are chosen to maximize profits corresponding to
the downstream vertically integrated structure for each of the J products. The retailers
add only retail costs to the wholesale prices. In equilibrium, pricing decisions are thus
implemented by the manufacturers and the share of total profits between retailers and
manufacturers is then unidentified and will depend on the reservation profits Πr of each
retailer. Then (7) becomes
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) +
∑
k∈{J ′,..,J}
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ Gf
because products in {J ′, .., J} are private labels which are also implicitly included in (7).
In this case, profit maximizing strategic pricing of private labels by retailers is also taken
into account by manufacturers when they choose fixed fees and retail prices for their own
products in the contract. The prices of private labels chosen by retailers are such that they
maximize their profit on these private labels.
Also in this case, we then obtain expression for the total price cost margins of all
national brands given the retail price cost margins of private labels as a function of demand
parameters and of the structure of the industry (see Appendix 8.2).
3.2.2 Two part tariffs without resale price maintenance
Consider now the case where resale price maintenance cannot be used by manufacturers.
Since they cannot choose retail prices, they just set wholesale prices in the following
maximization program
max
{wk}∈Gf
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
∑
k 6∈Gf
(pk − wk − ck)sk(p).
Then the first order conditions are for all i ∈ Gf
∑
k
∂pk
∂wi
sk(p)+
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)∑
j
∂sk
∂pj
∂pj
∂wi
+∑
k 6∈Gf
(pk − wk − ck)∑
j
∂sk
∂pj
∂pj
∂wi
 = 0
that allows for an estimate of the price-cost margins with demand parameters using (1)
to replace (pk − wk − ck) and (3) for all the ∂pj∂wi .
18
We are thus able to obtain several expressions for price-cost margins at the manu-
facturing or retail levels under the different models considered as a function of demand
parameters and of the structure of the industry (see detailed expressions in appendix 8.2).
4 Differentiated Product Demand
4.1 The Random Coefficients Logit Model
We use a random-coefficients logit model for the demand estimated using the method of
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Contrary to the standard logit model, the random-
coefficients logit model imposes very few restrictions on own and cross-price elasticities
(McFadden and Train, 2001). This flexibility makes it the most appropriate model to
obtain consistent estimates of the demand parameters required for computation of price-
cost margins.
The basic specification of the indirect utility function giving rise to demand is given
by
Vijt = βj + γt − αipjt + ξjt + εijt
where Vijt denotes the indirect latent utility of consumer i from buying product j during
month t, βj represents product fixed effects capturing time invariant product character-
istics, γt are time dummies capturing monthly unobserved determinants of demand (like
the weather), pjt is the price of product j during month t, ξjt identifies the mean across
consumers of unobserved (by the econometrician) changes in product characteristics, and
εijt represents separable additive random shocks. The random coefficient αi represents
the unknown marginal disutility of price for consumer i. This coefficient is allowed to vary
across consumers according to
αi = α+ σvi
where vi summarizes all the unobserved consumer characteristics, and σ is a coefficient
that characterizes how consumer marginal disutilities of price vary with respect to average
disutility α according to these unobserved characteristics. Indirect utility can be redefined
in terms of the mean utility δjt = βj+γt−αpjt+ ξjt and deviations from the mean utility
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µijt = −σvipjt, i.e.
Vijt = δjt + µijt + εijt.
The model is completed by the inclusion of an outside good, denoted good zero, al-
lowing for the possibility of consumer i not buying one of the Jt marketed products. The
price of this good is assumed to be set independently of the prices observed in the sample.
The mean utility of the outside good is normalized to be zero and constant over time. The
indirect utility of choosing the outside good is Ui0t = εi0t.
Idiosyncratic tastes εijt are assumed to be independently and identically distributed
according to Gumbel (extreme value type I) distribution. vi is assumed to be normally
distributed. Under these assumptions, the market share of product j for month t is given
by
sjt =
∫
Ajt
(
exp(δjt + µijt)
1 +
∑Jt
k=1 exp(δkt + µikt)
)
φ(vi) dvi (10)
where Ajt denotes the set of consumers traits that induce the purchase of product j during
month t. Moreover, denoting sijt ≡ exp(δjt + µijt)/(1 +
∑Jt
k=1 exp(δkt + µikt)), the own
and cross-price elasticities of the market share sjt defined by equation (10) are
ηjkt ≡
∂sjt
∂pkt
pkt
sjt
=
{
−pjtsjt
∫
αisijt(1− sijt) φ(vi)dvi if j = k
pkt
sjt
∫
αisijtsikt φ(vi)dvi otherwise.
(11)
The random-coefficients logit model generates a flexible pattern of substitutions be-
tween products driven by the different consumer price disutilities αi. Indeed, each con-
sumer will have a different price disutility, which will be averaged to a mean price sensitiv-
ity using the consumer specific probabilities of purchase sijt as weights. Therefore, cross-
price elasticities will not be constrained by the assumptions of homogeneity of marginal
price disutility across consumers and by the functional form of probabilities as in the
standard logit model.
Coming to the estimation of this model, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) show
how to estimate the demand parameters using data on market shares per product and
period to estimate sjt, on prices pjt and characteristics of goods. The GMM estimator is
formed8 using instrumental variables that need to be orthogonal to unobserved demand
8Nevo (2001) Matlab code was used to perform these estimations.
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determinants ξjt that appear in the demand, under the assumption that there is no serial
correlation of these unobservable shocks (after estimation, we have checked this assumption
which appears satisfied). As presented in the section 2, we use a household home scan
data to obtain aggregate market shares per product and period sjt as the total quantity
purchased of product j during period t divided by the size of the market, and we use the
purchase data to obtain an average price pjt. The characteristics of the good such as the
brand name, the retailer name, the minerality of water are all contained in these data
whose purchase information is at the bar code level.
As we also need instrumental variables that are collected from outside sources. Actually,
we also use the price of inputs of the bottling process as instruments. In fact, input
prices should not be correlated with consumer demand shocks. The instruments used
are the wage salary index for France and the diesel fuel and packaging material price
indices. Indeed, labor, diesel fuel and packaging materials are three significant production
factors in the processing and packaging of bottled water. As emphasized by Hellerstein
(2004), input prices such as wages are unlikely to have any relationship to the types
of promotional activity that will stimulate perceived changes in the characteristics of
the products considered. These monthly figures come the French National Institute for
Statistics and Economic Studies. These indices are interacted with dummy variables on the
characteristics of each product as with the minerality of water. The underlying intuition
is to allow each input to enter the production function of each product differently. In fact,
it is likely that labor cost is not the same for the production of mineral and spring water
(there are not the same requirements in terms of monitoring the quality of water at the
production stage and thus it is likely that mineral water requires more monitoring and
thus costs more in labor) but it is also known in this industry that the quality of plastic
used for mineral or spring water is usually not the same and this is also likely to affect
their bottling and packaging costs. Also, the relatively significant variations of all these
price indices during the period of study suggests a potentially good identification of our
cost equations.
21
4.2 Testing Between Alternative Models
We now present how to test between alternative models once we have estimated the de-
mand model and obtained the different price-cost margin estimates in accordance with the
expressions obtained in the section 3. The estimation procedure consisting in estimating
the demand model separately from the supply model is simple since it dispenses with the
need to reestimate the demand model for each supply model considered (Appendix 8.4
discusses the conditions of identification of the model in a one step procedure).
Then, for each supply model, we have a price cost margin and thus an estimate of
the total marginal cost (sum of the marginal cost of distribution and of production). The
idea of the following test which allows to infer which supply model is preferred consists in
testing each model against each other using some identifying restrictions imposed on the
cost estimates. Observing some additional variables supposed to affect marginal costs can
help infer which model is the best by looking at which estimated marginal costs are the
most correlated to such variables. The statistical method used is described below. Note
that testing each model against each other does not guarantee that the inference will lead
to a unique preferred model since there is no guarantee of transitivity of the tests. It
remains an empirical question.
Considering model h, we denote γhjt the retailer price cost margin for product j at time
t and Γhjt the manufacturer price cost margin under this model. Using C
h
jt = µ
h
jt + c
h
jt for
the sum of the marginal cost of production and distribution, we know that
Chjt = pjt − Γhjt − γhjt. (12)
Assume now the following specification for these marginal costs
Chjt = pjt − Γhjt − γhjt =
[
exp(ωhj +W
′
jtλh)
]
ηhjt
where ωhj is an unknown product specific parameter, Wjt are observable random shocks
to the marginal cost of product j at time t and ηhjt is an unobservable random shock to
the cost. Taking logarithms, the following is obtained
lnChjt = ω
h
j +W
′
jtλh + ln η
h
jt. (13)
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Assuming that E(ln ηhjt|ωhj ,Wjt) = 0, ωhj , λh, and ηhjt can be consistently estimated.
The idea in testing the different models is thus to infer which cost equation has the
best statistical fit given the observed cost shifters Wjt that depend on characteristics of
the brand of product j and not on the conjectured model. This equation is subject to
implicit restrictions, since for example products of the same brand but sold by different
retailers will have the same brand characteristics appearing in Wjt but different costs Chjt.
For example, we denote brand name the variable Wnjt for two products j and j′ of the
same brand but sold in different retailers, we have Wnjt = W
n
j′t while C
h
jt and C
h
j′t are not
necessarily equal.
Now, for any two models h and h′, one would like to test one model against the other,
that is test between
pjt = Γhjt + γ
h
jt +
[
exp(ωhj +W
′
jtλh)
]
ηhjt
and
pjt = Γh
′
jt + γ
h′
jt +
[
exp(ωh
′
j +W
′
jtλh′)
]
ηh
′
jt .
Using non-linear least squares, we implement the following:
min
λh,ω
h
j
Qhn(λh, ω
h
j ) = min
λh,ω
h
j
1
n
∑
j,t
(
ln ηhjt
)2
= min
λh,ω
h
j
1
n
∑
j,t
[
ln
(
pjt − Γhjt − γhjt
)
− ωhj −W ′jtλh
]2
Non-nested tests (Vuong, 1989, and Rivers and Vuong, 2002) are then applied to infer
which model h is statistically the best. This involves testing models against each other.
The test of Vuong (1989) applies in the context of maximum likelihood estimation and
thus would apply in our case if log-normality of ηhjt is assumed. Rivers and Vuong (2002)
generalized this kind of test to a broad class of estimation methods including nonlinear
least squares. Moreover, the Vuong (1989) or the Rivers and Vuong (2002) approaches
do not require that either competing model be correctly specified under the tested null
hypothesis. Indeed, other approaches such as Cox’s tests (see, among others, Smith, 1992)
require such an assumption, i.e. that one of the competing models accurately describes
the data. This assumption cannot be sustained when dealing with a real data set in the
present case.
23
Taking any two competing models h and h′, the null hypothesis is that the two non-
nested models are asymptotically equivalent when
H0 : lim
n→∞
{
Q¯hn(λh, ω
h
j )− Q¯h
′
n (λh′ , ω
h′
j )
}
= 0
where Q¯hn(λh, ω
h
j ) (resp. Q¯
h′
n (λh′ , ω
h′
j )) is the expectation of a lack-of-fit criterionQ
h
n(λh, ω
h
j )
(i.e. the opposite of a goodness-of-fit criterion) evaluated for model h (resp. h′) at the
pseudo-true values of the parameters of this model, denoted by λh, ωhj (resp. λh′ , ω
h′
j ).
The first alternative hypothesis is that h is asymptotically better than h′ when
H1 : lim
n→∞
{
Q¯hn(λh, ω
h
j )− Q¯h
′
n (λh′ , ω
h′
j )
}
< 0.
Similarly, the second alternative hypothesis is that h′ is asymptotically better than h when
H2 : lim
n→∞
{
Q¯hn(λh, ω
h
j )− Q¯h
′
n (λh′ , ω
h′
j )
}
> 0.
The test statistic Tn captures the statistical variation that characterizes the sample values
of the lack-of-fit criterion and is then defined as a suitably normalized difference of the
sample lack-of-fit criteria, i.e.
Tn =
√
n
σˆhh
′
n
{
Qhn(λ̂h, ω̂
h
j )−Qh
′
n (λ̂h′ , ω̂
h′
j )
}
where Qhn(λ̂h, ω̂
h
j ) (resp. Q
h′
n (λ̂h′ , ω̂
h′
j )) is the sample lack-of-fit criterion evaluated for
model h (resp. h′) at the estimated values of the parameters of this model, denoted by
λ̂h, ω̂
h
j (resp. λ̂h′ , ω̂
h′
j ). σˆ
hh′
n denotes the estimated value of the variance of the difference
in lack-of-fit. Since our models are strictly non-nested, Rivers and Vuong showed that the
asymptotic distribution of the Tn statistic is standard normal distribution. The selection
procedure involves comparing the sample value of Tn with critical values of the standard
normal distribution9. In the empirical section, evidence based on these different statistical
tests will be presented.
9If α denotes the desired size of the test and tα/2 the value of the inverse standard normal distribution
evaluated at 1−α/2. If Tn < tα/2 H0 is rejected in favor of H1; if Tn > tα/2 H0 is rejected in favor of H2.
Otherwise, H0 is not rejected.
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5 Econometric Estimation and Test Results
5.1 Demand Results
We estimated the demand model presented in section 4, as well as a standard multinomial
logit model. The estimates of the random-coefficients logit (RCL) model and the simple
multinomial logit (ML) are in Table 4 (the results of the first stage of this demand estimates
are given in appendix 8.5). The simple multinomial logit model is estimated using Two-
Stage least squares with the same kind of instrumental variables.
Coefficients (Std. error) ML RCL RCL
Robustness check
(1) (2) (3)
Price (−α) -5.47 (0.44) -8.95 (1.14) -10.74 (1.45)
Price (σ) 2.04 (0.81) 3.61 (1.20)
Std dev. of Price 0.81 (1.13)
Average distance 0.03 (0.06)
Coefficients βj , γt not shown
Overidentifying restrictions test 6.30 (χ2(10)) 7.81 (χ2(3)) 12.50 (χ2(8))
Table 4: Estimation Results of Demand Models
The results show that the price coefficient has the correct sign. In the case of the
random coefficients logit model, the price coefficient has a distribution with mean equal
to 8.95 and standard deviation equal to 2.04. This implies that an infinitesimal part of the
distribution of the coefficient αi is negative. In both estimations, all the 54 βj and 39 γt
coefficients are not shown to save space. As Table 4 shows, the overidentifying restrictions
tests are not rejected. Also, we have checked after estimation that ξjt is not serially
correlated. Actually, the first and the second order serial correlations is equal to 0.019
with a standard error of 0.02 and to 0.016 with standard error of 0.02, respectively, which
proves that it is not significantly different from zero.
As we said in section 2, the aggregate data come from the aggregation of a household
survey and thus aggregation problems may raise some questions about the demand results.
To ensure the reliability of our demand model, we conducted several specification tests
before reaching the specification shown in Table 4. We also tried to investigate the question
of possibly downward biased average prices by testing the robustness of our demand model
with the following method. First, we computed the observed variance of each product price
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across purchases for any given month and introduced this product characteristic into the
demand model. If our average prices are downward biased, this bias is likely to be positively
correlated with the within month and across stores variance of the price for a product.
Then, introducing this characteristic in the demand model, we should expect a positive
coefficient. This is what is found but the coefficient is small (0.809) and far from significant
(its standard error being 1.14). Moreover, when this variable is introduced, it does not
significantly change the estimates of our price coefficients α and σ. The same approach
was applied by using the distance from home to the retailer obtained with the observation
of the location of the all supermarkets in France using LSA data, and using zip codes for
households and geographical data on distances. The average distance of purchasers of each
product at each month was calculated and introduced as a characteristic. Again, the other
parameters of the demand model did not change significantly and the coefficient of this
variable did not appear significant (its estimate was 0.031 with a standard error of 0.059).
This was true whether introducing these variables jointly or not. Column (3) of Table 4
shows the results when both variables are introduced. Finally, we assessed the robustness
of the simplification amounting to consider the most important brands (in terms of market
share) by adding the next most important one. Adding one brand, whose market share is
on average 0.022% only, the results of the random coefficients logit model did not change
significantly. The price coefficient was 9.8 and the coefficient of heterogeneity of tastes was
2.7. Moreover, with all these alternative specifications, the empirical results of interest
that appear in the following did not change significantly.
Given the demand estimates, it is interesting to note that we find estimates of un-
observed product specific mean utilities βj are found. Using these parameter estimates,
their correlation with observed product characteristics can be considered using regression
estimates. This is shown in Table 5 below.
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GLS regression (with robust standard errors)
Dependent Variable : Fixed Effects βj
Explanatory variables Coefficient (Std. error) Coefficient (Std. error)
Mineral Water (0/1) -2.76 (0.11) 4.71 (0.18)
Minerality 0.70 (0.05) 0.19 (0.08)
Manufacturer 1 6.14 (0.10)
Manufacturer 2 5.53 (0.10)
Manufacturer 3 -4.44 (0.09)
Brand 3 -0.85 (0.18)
Brand 4 -1.57 (0.20)
Brand 5 -0.87 (0.17)
Brand 6 -3.00 (0.18)
Brand 7 -7.26 (0.17)
Retailer 2 0.26 (0.18)
Retailer 3 -0.71 (0.17)
Retailer 4 0.20 (0.18)
Retailer 5 0.25 (0.18)
Retailer 6 -0.35 (0.18)
Retailer 7 -0.13 (0.18)
Constant 2.96 (0.06) 2.59 (0.18)
F test (p value) 3576.20 (0.00) 308.12 (0.00)
Table 5: Regression of fixed effects on the product characteristics
The first column of Table 5 shows that the product specific constant mean utility βj
is increasing with the minerality of water and that the identity of the manufacturer of
the bottled water affects this mean utility. The second column of Table 5 shows that
controlling for brand effects is very important and that, everything else equal, the mean
utility is larger for mineral water rather than spring water (while it is the contrary if
one does not control for brand effects as in column 1). This is probably due to image,
reputation and advertising at the retail and brand levels.
Finally, once the structural demand estimates have been obtained, price elasticities of
demand for each differentiated product can be calculated. Table 6 shows the average
elasticities for different groups of products.
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Elasticities (ηjk) Random Coefficients Logit
Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity
All bottle water Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
-10.12 2.65 0.05 0.02
Mineral water
-11.38 1.59 0.06 0.01
Spring water
-6.64 1.71 0.03 0.01
Brand
1 -11.92 0.98 0.06 0.03
2 -12.96 0.39 0.03 0.02
3 -11.66 1.53 0.05 0.02
4 -10.44 0.49 0.07 0.03
5 -11.00 0.48 0.10 0.04
6 -4.97 0.32 0.03 0.01
7 -8.10 1.04 0.03 0.01
8 -8.23 0.60 0.08 0.03
Retailer
1 -9.86 2.47 0.06 0.02
2 -10.21 2.65 0.07 0.02
3 -10.03 2.83 0.02 0.01
4 -9.92 2.35 0.11 0.04
5 -9.61 2.56 0.10 0.03
6 -10.44 2.62 0.04 0.01
7 -10.23 2.73 0.03 0.01
Table 6: Summary of Elasticities Estimates
On average, the own price elasticity is -10.1 and appears to be almost double for
mineral water rather than for spring water (brands 6 and 8). Mineral water products
seem then to be more sensitive to changes in its prices than spring water products. This
implies that manufacturers and retailers margins for spring water products will be higher
(and almost the double) than for mineral water products. Differences between brands and
between retailers also exist and thus elasticities also vary across products within the spring
water or mineral water categories. Cross-price elasticities are positive but much less so in
absolute value, which is not surprising given the number of products obtained by allowing
products to differ not only by brand but also by retailer. These cross-price elasticities
do vary across brands and retailers and standard deviations show that they vary across
brands at a same retailer or across retailers for a given brand. Standard deviations of
own-price elasticities show that they do vary more across brands at a given retailer than
across retailer for a given brand.
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5.2 Price-Cost Margins
Once demand parameters have been estimated, we obtain the price cost margins at the
retailer and manufacturer levels or total price cost margins for all products, under the
various scenarios considered. Each scenario can be described according to the assumptions
made on the manufacturers’ behavior (collusive or Nash), the retailers’ behavior (collusive
or Nash) and the vertical interaction which can be Stackelberg or Nash under double
marginalization or RPM or not under two part tariff contracts. The models described
in the following Table are considered, where the producer is always a Stackelberg under
nonlinear contracts.
Models Retailer Manufacturer Vertical
Behavior Behavior Interaction
Double marginalization
Model 1 Collusion Nash Nash
Model 2 Collusion Nash Stackelberg
Model 3 Collusion Collusion Nash
Model 4 Collusion Collusion Stackelberg
Model 5 Nash Nash Nash
Model 6 Nash Nash Stackelberg
Model 7 Nash Collusion Nash
Model 8 Nash Collusion Stackelberg
Two Part Tariffs
Model 9 Nash Nash RPM (w = µ)
Model 10 Nash Nash RPM (p = w + c)
Model 11 Collusion Collusion RPM (p = w + c)
Model 12 Nash Nash no RPM
Note that in the case of private labels products, it is assumed that the retailer is also
the producer, which amounts in our models to assuming that the behavior for pricing
private labels is equivalent to that of a manufacturer perfectly colluding with the retailer
for that good. Of course, only the total price cost margin is then computed for these
private label goods because it then becomes meaningless to compute wholesale price and
retail price margins separately.
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Price-Cost Margins (% of retail price p) Mineral Water Spring Water
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Double Marginalization
Model 1 Retailers 13.48 1.43 19.80 3.60
Manufacturers 9.90 0.77 20.62 1.13
Total 23.07 1.67 43.91 2.16
Model 2 Retailers 13.48 1.44 19.80 3.60
Manufacturers 9.77 0.64 19.02 1.09
Total 22.94 1.50 42.31 2.11
Model 3 Retailers 13.48 1.43 19.80 3.60
Manufacturers 11.99 0.88 22.32 1.04
Total 25.10 1.84 45.61 2.11
Model 4 Retailers 13.48 1.43 19.80 3.60
Manufacturers 12.76 0.75 21.35 0.97
Total 25.94 1.69 44.63 2.03
Model 5 Retailers 9.45 1.48 16.49 4.06
Manufacturers 9.90 0.77 20.62 1.13
Total 19.02 1.65 41.05 2.19
Model 6 Retailers 9.45 1.48 16.49 4.06
Manufacturers 10.53 4.12 20.20 1.95
Total 19.66 4.22 40.64 2.56
Model 7 Retailers 9.45 1.48 16.49 4.06
Manufacturers 11.93 0.88 22.32 1.04
Total 21.05 1.73 42.75 2.09
Model 8 Retailers 9.45 1.48 16.49 4.06
Manufacturers 13.42 2.96 22.75 3.79
Total 22.54 3.04 43.19 3.96
Two part Tariffs with RPM
Model 9 Nash and w = µ 12.90 1.03 17.87 5.29
Model 10 Nash and p = w + c 10.85 1.06 16.70 4.61
Model 11 Collusion and p = w + c 12.93 1.03 17.95 5.20
Two-part Tariffs without RPM
Model 12 Retailers 9.45 1.48 16.49 4.06
Manufacturers 2.94 1.13 1.93 0.43
Total 12.07 1.36 22.45 1.04
Table 7: Estimated Price-Cost Margins
Table 7 then shows the averages10 of product level price cost margin estimates under
the different models with the random-coefficients logit demand. It is worth noting that
price cost margins are generally lower for mineral water than for spring water. As expected,
it can be seen that total price-cost margins are much lower for two-part tariff models than
for linear pricing models. Although the most significant source of variation in margins
10Note that the average price-cost margin at retailer level plus the average price-cost margin at manu-
facturer level do not sum to the total price cost margin because of the private labels products for which
no price cost margin at manufacturer level is computed, the retailer price cost margin being equal to the
total price cost margin.
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lies in the comparison of linear versus nonlinear pricing models, margins still vary quite
substantially among linear pricing models only or among two-part tariff models. Under
linear pricing, when there is no collusion at the retailer level, retailers’ margins are on
average smaller than manufacturers’ margins but still quite high for the food retailing
sector.
It is to be noted that the flexibility of the random coefficients logit model allows
estimated margins to vary across retailers for a given brand and across brands for a given
retailer. The Table 8 in the following shows the average price-cost margins and the average
variances of these margins across retailers for a given brand or across brands for a given
retailers for the model of two part tariffs with resale price maintenance (Model 10) which
will be the preferred model according non-nested tests results in the next section. It
appears clearly that these margins do vary in all dimensions11. The column (Std. Dev.)
shows that average across periods of the standard deviations of margins across products
of the same brand or the same retailer. It shows that estimated margins do vary across
products and not only across periods. The flexibility of the random coefficients logit model
is demonstrated here by the fact that margins vary across products.
Model Two Part Tariffs with RPM
Mean Std. Dev.
Retailer
1 12.48 4.05
2 12.23 3.55
3 12.58 4.01
4 12.47 3.69
5 12.87 3.88
6 12.11 3.88
7 12.17 3.92
Brand
1 10.16 0.44
2 9.89 0.16
3 10.84 0.55
4 11.31 0.35
5 11.21 0.30
6 21.21 0.99
7 12.62 1.69
8 12.23 0.81
11This is also true for wholesale and retail level margins when they can be identified as in double
marginalization models or in two-part tariffs without resale price maintenance.
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Table 8: Variations of estimated margins across products (percent or retail price)
5.3 Estimates of cost equations and nonnested tests
After estimating the different price cost margins for the models considered, the marginal
cost Chjt can be derived using equation (12) and we then estimate cost equations. Table 9
shows the empirical results of estimation of the cost equation (13) for h = 1, ..., 12 that is
lnChjt = ω
h
j +Wjtλg + ln η
h
jt
where ωhj is a product specific fixed effect, variables Wjt include time dummies δt, wages,
oil, diesel fuel, packaging material and plastic price variables interacted with the dummy
variable for spring water (SW ) and mineral water (MW ).
lnChjt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coeff. (Std. err.)
salary × SW 0.03 (0.21) 0.04 (0.20) -0.02 (0.21) -0.02 (0.21) 0.12 (0.21) -0.01 (0.22)
salary× MW 0.16 (0.18) 0.16 (0.18) 0.10 (0.18) 0.09 (0.18) 0.25 (0.18) 0.08 (0.23)
plastic× SW -0.02 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) -0.03 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) -0.07 (0.11)
plastic× MW -0.02(0.08) -0.01 (0.08) -0.02 (0.08) -0.02 (0.08) -0.02 (0.08) -0.10 (0.10)
packaging× SW 0.11 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05) 0.12 (0.05) 0.12 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.13 (0.07)
packaging× MW 0.10 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05) 0.11 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 0.10 (0.06)
diesel× SW 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
diesel× MW 0.03 (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02)
oil× SW -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04)
oil× MW -0.05 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) -0.11 (0.03)
constant -2.05 (2.00) -2.06 (1.97) -1.59 (2.01) -1.42 (1.99) -2.62 (1.98) -0.78 (2.45)
All δt=0 F test (p val.) 2.89 (0.00) 2.86 (0.00) 3.00 (0.00) 2.96 (0.00) 2.75 (0.001) 3.59 (0.00)
All ωhj=0 F test (p val.) 490.1 (0.00) 480.4 (0.00) 499.5 (0.00) 493.9(0.00) 493.8 (0.00) 320.4 (0.00)
Table 9 : Cost Equations for the Random Coefficients Logit Model
lnChjt Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Coeff. (Std. err.)
salary× SW 0.07 (0.21) 0.04 (0.21) 0.06 (0.19) 0.12 (0.19) 0.08 (0.17) 0.11 (0.19)
salary× MW 0.20 (0.18) 0.06 (0.18) 0.18 (0.17) 0.24 (0.17) 0.20 (0.17) 0.20 (0.17)
plastic× SW -0.02 (0.09) -0.05 (0.09) -0.01 (0.08) -0.02 (0.09) -0.02 (0.09) -0.04 (0.08)
plastic× MW -0.02 (0.08) -0.05 (0.08) -0.01 (0.08) -0.02 (0.08) -0.02 (0.08) -0.07 (0.08)
packaging× SW 0.09 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05)
packaging× MW 0.08 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) 0.09 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.07 (0.04) 0.09 (0.04)
diesel× SW 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
diesel× MW 0.05 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02)
oil× SW -0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03)
oil× MW -0.04 (0.02) -0.09 (0.05) -0.05 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) -0.07 (0.03)
constant -2.19 (1.99) -0.94 (2.02) -2.06 (1.85) -2.39 (1.85) -2.05 (1.84) -1.74 (1.89)
All δt=0 F test (p val.) 2.68 (0.001) 2.68 (0.001) 2.96 (0.000) 2.80 (0.001) 2.76 (0.001) 3.54 (0.000)
All ωhj=0 F test (p val.) 504.1 (0.00) 489.2 (0.00) 395.6 (0.00) 390.5 (0.00) 392.9 (0.00) 299.7 (0.00)
Table 9 (continued): Cost Equations for the Random Coefficients Logit Model
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The results of these cost equations are useful mostly in order to test which model
best fits the data. However, it is interesting to see that even if product level dummies
and period dummies are highly significant, other explanatory variables are also worthy
of note. In particular, the packaging cost variable is almost always significant, while oil
and diesel price indices are also quite often significant. Salary indices and plastic cost
variables are never significant at the 5% conventional level. Finally, the significance of
these variable cost shifters vary across equations, that is across models. The coefficients
of the cost shifters are always of the same sign across models but the absolute values of
these coefficients can vary from one to four across models.
The Rivers and Vuong non-nested tests explained in section 4.2 were then performed.
The results are given in Table 10. In order to take into account the fact that each cost
equation uses cost estimates that have been estimated after the estimation of the demand
model, the bootstrap was used. The statistics of test12 shown in Table 10 are thus bootstrap
statistics with 500 replications. Statistics in parentheses are standard deviations of the
test statistic over the replications. Even if tests need not be transitive, we can see that
model 10 is the best because its column statistic estimates are always negative and lower
than the 5% negative critical value of a normal test that Tn is different from zero while the
row statistic if higher than the 5% positive critical value. The Vuong (1989) tests based
on the maximum likelihood estimation of the cost equations under normality provides the
same inference concerning the best model (see Table 13 in appendix 8.6).
12Recall that for a 5% size of the test, H0 is rejected in favor of H2 if Tn is lower than the critical value
-1.64 and that H0 is rejected in favor of H1 if Tn is higher than the critical value 1.64.
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Rivers and Vuong Test Statistic Tn =
√
n
σ̂n
(
Q2n(Θˆ
2
n)−Q1n(Θˆ
1
n)
)
→ N(0, 1)
 H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 -8.33 6.60 -1.47 -5.75 1.94 -3.92 2.00 -8.07 -8.19 -7.99 -1.73
(5.88) (3.93) (7.32) (3.14) (3.53) (3.19) (3.45) (2.76) (2.73) (2.73) (4.94)
2 8.75 6.63 2.11 2.64 6.88 2.99 -6.51 -6.94 -6.50 -0.84
(5.01) (6.19) (7.54) (4.23) (7.59) (5.33) (4.31) (4.24) (4.32) (6.68)
3 -5.08 -6.08 1.88 -5.79 1.88 -7.88 -7.89 -7.80 -1.74
(8.27) (3.93) (3.80) (3.74) (3.75) (3.67) (3.65) (3.70) (5.10)
4 -1.60 1.91 0.53 2.35 -7.22 -7.75 -7.22 -1.41
(7.29) (4.67) (7.50) (4.90) (4.74) (5.05) (4.59) (6.84)
5 2.85 6.22 3.12 -8.00 -8.50 -8.16 -1.04
(3.30) (3.43) (4.52) (4.17) (3.90) (4.46) (5.97)
6 -2.32 0.18 -4.95 -5.24 -4.91 -3.58
(3.38) (4.54) (3.15) (3.60) (3.09) (4.56)
7 2.61 -8.27 -8.64 -8.33 -1.39
(3.93) (3.90) (3.18) (4.05) (5.49)
8 -5.59 -5.84 -5.55 -3.68
(4.22) (4.96) (4.07) (3.98)
9 -5.09 -0.27 2.86
(4.49) (2.84) (3.92)
10 5.02 4.25
(4.72) (4.59)
11 2.87
(3.90)
Table 10: Results of the Rivers and Vuong Test (500 Bootstrap replications)
The non-rejected model indicates that manufacturers use two part tariffs with retail-
ers and moreover (as predicted by the theory) that they use resale price maintenance
in their contracting relationships although in principle this is not legal in France. In
this equilibrium, variable retail margins are zero but total profits including fixed fees are
unidentified. It is interesting, however, to note that this equilibrium is such that man-
ufacturers are residual claimants. Zero retail margins also imply that fixed fees paid by
retailers to manufacturers are negative if the outside option (reservation profit) of re-
tailers is strictly positive. Thus this model implies that manufacturers pay some sort of
slotting allowances to retailers, a practice for which the press often reports evidence in
France. Although resale price maintenance is illegal in France, our empirical results show
that contractual relationships imply pricing strategies that allow this equilibrium to be
replicated. It is worth noting that this pricing equilibrium could be reached through the
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use of two part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance, but it is possible that it is
actually implemented through more complex non-linear contracts that would not involve
resale price maintenance (Rey and Verge´, 2004). Another possible explanation of this
finding is linked to the French regulatory environment about vertical relationships in the
supermarket industry and the Galland act passed in 1996 in France (until 2006) which was
in action at the time of our data (1998-2000). This law prevented resale-below-cost but
this rule could be easily manipulated by manufacturers who would purposely display high
wholesale prices in order to prevent retailers to resale at lower prices (because apparently
“at loss”) while the true wholesale prices were different (because at that time the definition
of wholesale prices for the competition agency did not include some costs finally paid by
manufacturers such as product placement on store shelves for example).
One main difference introduced by resale price maintenance is that it avoids the double
marginalization problem such that empirically, given the demand estimates, what matters
for retail prices fixing is the structure of manufacturers’ competition and not the retailers’
competition (omitting the additional effect of private labels). Of course, this structure
does not change in the data, but if one could observe a merger of two retailers, this should
not change anything in the strategic choices of manufacturers (if demand stays the same).
On the contrary, if there is no RPM, then the retailer industry structure matters since
retail prices depend on reaction functions of retailers with respect to wholesale prices
(due to the second partial derivatives of market shares with respect to retail prices). The
curvature of the demand function thus matters while it is not the case with RPM.
For this preferred model, the estimated total price cost margins (price minus marginal
cost of production and distribution), are relatively low with an average of 11% for mineral
water and 17% for spring water according to the Table 7. These figures are lower than
the rough accounting estimates that can be obtained from aggregate data (see section 2).
As Nevo (2001) remarks, the accounting margins only provide an upper bound for the
true values. Moreover, the accounting estimates do not take into account the marginal
cost of distribution while our structural estimates do. Thus, these empirical results seem
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quite realistic and consistent with the bounds provided by accounting data. In absolute
values, the price-cost margins are on average close for mineral and spring waters because
mineral water is on average more expensive. Absolute margins are on average 0.037 C=
for mineral water and 0.025C= for spring water. With the best model, average price-cost
margins for national brand products versus private labels products can be evaluated. In
the case of mineral water, the average price-cost margins for national brands and private
labels are not statistically different and about the same with an average of 10.68% for
national brands and 12.61% for private labels. However, in the case of natural spring
water, it appears that price-cost margins for national brands are larger than for private
labels with an average of 21.20% instead of 12.22%.
6 Simulation of Counterfactual Policy Experiments
Estimation of the structural demand and cost parameters now allows some counterfactual
policy experiments to be simulated. First the method used to simulate these counterfactual
policy experiments will be presented, followed by the particular policies and simulation
results considered.
The previous estimation and inference allow a vector of marginal costs of production
and distribution for the preferred model to be estimated. We denote by If , Ir, the true
ownership matrices for manufacturers and retailers and h the preferred pricing equilibrium
according to the data. We denote Ct = (C1t, .., Cjt, .., CJt) the vector of the marginal
costs for all products present at time t, where Cjt = pjt − Γjt − γjt. Then, given these
marginal costs and the other estimated structural parameters, some policy experiments
can be simulated using equilibrium conditions of the supply model considered and using
I∗f and I
∗
r the respective ownership matrices of manufacturers and retailers under the
counterfactual policy.
Consider the policy experiment where product’s ownership has been changed to I∗f ,
I∗r . Equilibrium prices p∗t as solutions of the first order equations obtained under the chosen
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policy experiment have to be solved. For example in the case of two part tariffs with RPM:
p∗t + (I
∗
fSp (p
∗
t ))
−1I∗fs(p
∗
t ) = Ct. (14)
Market shares s(p∗t ) and their derivatives Sp (p∗t ) depend of equilibrium prices p∗t and the
demand model. According to (10), each market share depends on the vector of prices as
sjt(p∗t ) =
∫
Ajt
(
exp(δ∗jt + µ∗ijt)
1 +
∑Jt
k=1 exp(δ
∗
kt + µ∗ikt)
)
φ(vi)dvi
which is estimated as 1R
R∑
r=1
exp(δ∗jt+µ∗rjt)
1+
∑Jt
k=1 exp(δ
∗
kt+µ
∗
rkt)
where R is the number of draws used to
compute the market share by simulation. Moreover, using (11), each element of the matrix
of derivatives of the demand Sp (p∗t ) can be computed as
∂sjt
∂pkt
=
{ − ∫ αisijt(1− sijt) φ(vi)dvi if j = k∫
αisijtsikt φ(vi)dvi otherwise.
Thus solving the nonlinear equation (14) with respect to the prices p∗jt, simulated equilib-
rium prices under such policy are obtained. Market shares are obtained using simulated
prices. The solution vector p∗t of
min
{p∗jt}j=1,..,J
∥∥p∗t + (I∗fSp (p∗t ))−1I∗fs(p∗t )− Ct∥∥ (15)
is sought where ‖.‖ is a norm of RJ . In practice, the Euclidean norm in RJ will be taken.
Given equilibrium prices under the counterfactual policy, the change in consumer sur-
plus CSt(pt)−CSt(p∗t ) can be evaluated using the usual formula for the random coefficients
logit model
CSt(pt) =
1
|αi|E
[
max
j
Vijt (pt)
]
=
1
|αi| ln
 J∑
j=1
exp [Vijt (pt)]
 .
Note that the profits of firms are not identified since the equilibrium conditions allow a
solution for the prices but not for the fixed fees.
Table 11 shows the results of simulations of different policies. Average effects are pre-
sented given that one simulation per period is performed and the standard deviations of all
these simulations are shown in parentheses. As the parameters of demand and cost used to
perform the simulations are estimated, standard errors of all simulated policies on prices,
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market shares and consumer surplus can be obtained by bootstrap. However, solving the
system of equations (15) is already quite long and doing this for each bootstrap replication
of the whole estimation and simulation for all periods is extremely time-consuming. The
results of the simulation must thus be taken with caution since standard errors are not
computed. However, the bootstrap of test statistics and cost equations in the previous
section show that the precision of results was fairly robust.
In Table 11, the first simulation considers the case of a de-merger of Nestle´ and Perrier.
The merger of these companies that occurred in 1992 has been controversial. This merger
transferred Contrex from Perrier to Nestle´ while Volvic (of Perrier) went over to Danone
(BSN). The results of the simulation show that prices would decrease with such a de-
merger which would suggest that the merger has increased prices. The consumer surplus
variation also shows that the merger would have led to a decrease by a little more than 1%.
Table 13 also shows the results of the linear pricing case (without changing ownership of
products), a supply model where the effect of the double marginalization on retail prices
can be clearly seen. Indeed, we see that double marginalization would increase prices of
national brands and decrease the private labels ones, consumer surplus would then fall in
a large way.
In 1996, the ”Galland” Act was introduced. This law requires retailers not to resell
under the wholesale price, giving manufacturers the power to impose resale price main-
tenance by choosing their wholesale price. The Galland Act was removed in 2006 under
the assumption that it helped some food industries maintain high prices. One way to see
this reform is to consider the case where no resale price maintenance would be used by
manufacturers. Simulating the two part tariffs without RPM, we can see that the con-
sumer surplus would increase by 0.8%. On average, prices would decrease for most brands
except for private labels. This simulation shows that removing the Galland Act in 2006
should have had beneficial effects on prices for consumers. Using data before and after the
implementation of this law, Biscourp, Boutin and Verge´ (2008) show with reduced form
regressions that this law actually had an inflationary effect on prices in 1996. A result
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which is in line with our policy experiment that can be seen as the dismantling of the
Galland Act.
Policy % Change % Change in
of price p∗jt market share s
∗
jt
Nestle´/Perrier de-merger
Average -1.65 (0.13) 14.60 (1.61)
Average for Danone (BSN) -1.59 (0.09) 14.52 (1.51)
Average for Nestle´ -1.93 (0.16) 19.09 (2.71)
Average for Perrier -1.80 (0.18) 15.98 (2.30)
Average for Castel -0.56 (0.19) 1.46 (1.02)
Average for Private Labels -0.48 (0.21) 0.89 (1.88)
Average for outside good -0.21 (0.02)
CSt(pt)−CSt(p∗t )
CSt(pt)
in % 1.35 (0.24)
Double Marginalization (linear pricing)
Average 6.73 (9.19) -40.05 (56.79)
Average for Danone 6.82 (6.42) -52.37 (6.33)
Average for Nestle´ 7.23 (7.42) -54.17 (9.24)
Average for Castel 15.45 (13.51) -43.09 (141.71)
Average for Private Labels –0.47 (6.41) 10.82 (2.81)
Average for outside good 1.05 (0.09)
CSt(p∗t )−CSt(pt)
CSt(pt)
in % -13.18 (23.24)
Two part Tariffs without RPM
Average -7.44 (5.44) 71.11 (50.12)
Average for Danone -7.30 (0.66) 78.45 (9.33)
Average for Nestle´ -7.45 (0.85) 82.92 (12.15)
Average for Castel -19.05 (1.52) 148.75 (21.81)
Average for Private Labels 0.30 (0.16) -17.99 (2.80)
Average for outside good -2.07 (0.42)
CSt(pt)−CSt(p∗t )
CSt(pt)
in % 0.81 (0.39)
Table 11: Policy experiments results
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present the first empirical investigation of a structural model taking
into account two part tariff contracts in vertical relationships between manufacturers and
retailers in the supermarket industry. Using a particular game form, we test among models
of competition between manufacturers and retailers on a differentiated product market.
In particular, attention was devoted to two types of nonlinear pricing relationships with
two part tariff contracts, with or without resale price maintenance. The method is based
on estimates of demand parameters that allow price-cost margins at the manufacturer and
retailer levels to be recovered. Testing was then conducted between the different models
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using exogenous variables that are supposed to shift the marginal cost of production and
distribution. This methodology was applied to study the market for retailing bottled water
in France.
Our empirical analysis implies that manufacturers and retailers use nonlinear pricing
contracts and in particular two part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. We in-
terpret the results under the hypothesis that the ”Galland” Act introduced in 1996, which
required retailers not to resell under the wholesale price, probably gave manufacturers the
power to impose resale price maintenance by choosing their wholesale price. Simulating
the two part tariffs without RPM, we find that the consumer surplus would increase by
0.8%. This simulation shows that removing the Galland Act in 2006 should have had
beneficial effects on prices for consumers.
This paper’s contribution is to allow for estimation of a structural model with a rich
set of equilibria under nonlinear contracts. The methodology developed allows different
vertical contracting models to be tested in a context of oligopoly both at upstream and
downstream levels. For this purpose, as in Rey and Verge´ (2004) a game is adopted
where upstream firms play first and can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to downstream
firms. We leave for further research the analysis of more complex interactions where offers
and counter offers could be made in a more dynamic setting. In Gans (2007), orders
precede procurement. Downstream firms play first and he shows that even with nonlinear
tariffs an oligopolistically competitive outcome is obtained. However, the model of Gans
is restricted to an upstream monopolist facing competing downstream firms, which is not
true of the framework studied here. In any case, it is true that the models considered
are static and that relationship between manufacturers and retailers are in fact repeated.
We leave for further research the analysis of dynamic models that will probably be much
more complex. Adding the possibility of storage at several stages of the model will also
be needed in the future.
Further developments estimating supply models of oligopolistic competition under non-
linear pricing are needed. In particular, further studies are required where assumptions
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of non-constant marginal cost of production and distribution would be allowed. Also, it is
clear that more empirical work on other markets will be useful for a better understanding
of vertical relationships in the retailing industry. Another research direction that seems
promising would involve in developing the present framework to use necessary inequality
conditions instead of first order conditions for the identification of bounds on the different
margins at the retail and wholesale levels. Rosen’s approach (2007) where the strategic
interaction is imperfectly known or Pakes et al. (2006) can thus be applied for future
research on the framework proposed with two part tariff contracts. Finally, taking into
account the endogenous market structure is also an objective that theoretical and empirical
research will have to tackle.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Detailed proof of the manufacturers profit expression under two
part tariffs
The theoretical results due to Rey and Verge´ (2004) are applied to our context with
F firms and R retailers. The participation constraint being binding, we have for all r∑
s∈Sr
[M(ps − ws − cs)ss(p)− Fs] = 0 which implies that∑
s∈Sr
Fs =
∑
s∈Sr
M(ps − ws − cs)ss(p)
and thus
∑
j∈Gf
Fj +
∑
j 6∈Gf
Fj =
∑
j=1,.,J
Fj =
∑
r=1,.,R
∑
s∈Sr
Fs
=
∑
r=1,.,R
∑
s∈Sr
M(ps − ws − cs)ss(p) =
∑
j=1,.,J
M(pj − wj − cj)sj(p)
so that ∑
j∈Gf
Fj =
∑
j=1,..,J
M(pj − wj − cj)sj(p)−
∑
j 6∈Gf
Fj .
Then, the firm f profits are
Πf =
∑
k∈Gf
M(wk − µk)sk(p) +
∑
k∈Gf
Fk
=
∑
k∈Gf
M(wk − µk)sk(p) +
∑
j=1,..,J
M(pj − wj − cj)sj(p)−
∑
j 6∈Gf
Fj
Since producers set fixed fees given those of other producers, the following obtains under
resale price maintenance:
max
{Fi,pi}i∈Gf
Πf ⇔ max
{pi}i∈Gf
∑
k∈Gf
(wk − µk)sk(p) +
∑
j=1,..,J
(pj − wj − cj)sj(p)
⇔ max
{pi}i∈Gf
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
∑
k 6∈Gf
(pk − wk − ck)sk(p)
and with no resale price maintenance
max
{Fi,wi}i∈Gf
Πf ⇔ max
{wi}i∈Gf
∑
k∈Gf
(wk − µk)sk(p) +
∑
j=1,..,J
(pj − wj − cj)sj(p)
⇔ max
{wi}i∈Gf
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
∑
k 6∈Gf
(pk − wk − ck)sk(p)
Then the first order conditions of the different two part tariff models can be derived very
simply.
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8.2 Matrix Expression of First Order conditions
8.2.1 Double marginalization
The maximization program of retailers gives the following first order conditions:
sj +
∑
k∈Sr
(pk − wk − ck)∂sk
∂pj
= 0, for all j ∈ Sr. (16)
Let Ir define the (J × J) ownership matrix of the retailer r that is diagonal and whose
element Ir(j, j) is equal to one if retailer r sells product j and zero otherwise. Let Sp be
the market share response matrix to retailer prices, containing the first derivatives of all
market shares with respect to all retail prices, i.e.
Sp ≡

∂s1
∂p1
. . . ∂sJ∂p1
...
...
∂s1
∂pJ
. . . ∂sJ∂pJ

In vector notation, previous first order conditions (1) implies that the vector γ of retailer
r’s margins, i.e. the retail price p minus the wholesale price w minus the marginal cost of
distribution c, is13
γ ≡ p− w − c = − (IrSpIr)−1 Irs(p). (17)
The first order conditions from the maximization program of manufacturers are:
sj +
∑
k∈Gf
∑
l=1,..,J
(wk − µk)
∂sk
∂pl
∂pl
∂wj
= 0, for all j ∈ Gf .
Consider If the ownership matrix of manufacturer f that is diagonal and whose element
If (j, j) is equal to one if j is produced by the manufacturer f and zero otherwise. Pw the
(J × J) matrix of retail prices responses to wholesale prices, containing the first derivatives
of the J retail prices p with respect to the J ′ wholesale prices w, is introduced.
Pw ≡

∂p1
∂w1
..
∂pJ′
∂w1
.. ∂pJ∂w1
...
...
...
∂p1
∂wJ′ ..
∂pJ′
∂wJ′
.. ∂pJ∂wJ′
0 .. 0 .. 0
0 .. 0 .. 0

13Remark that in all the following, when the inverse of non invertible matrices is used, it means the
matrix of generalized inverse is considered, meaning that for example
[
2 0
0 0
]−1
=
[
1/2 0
0 0
]
.
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Note that the last J − J ′ lines of this matrix are zero because they correspond to private
label products for which wholesale prices have no meaning.
The first order conditions (2) can then be expressed in matrix form and the vector of
manufacturer’s margins is14
Γ ≡ w − µ = −(IfPwSpIf )−1Ifs(p). (18)
The derivatives of retail prices with respect to wholesale prices depend on the strategic
interactions between manufacturers and retailers. Pw can be deduced from the total
differentiation of the retailer’s first order conditions (1) with respect to wholesale price,
i.e. for j ∈ Sr and k = 1, .., J ′
∑
l=1,..,J
∂sj(p)
∂pl
∂pl
∂wk
−1{k∈Sr}
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+
∑
l∈Sr
∂sl(p)
∂pj
∂pl
∂wk
+
∑
l∈Sr
(pl−wl−cl)
∑
s=1,..,J
∂2sl(p)
∂pj∂ps
∂ps
∂wk
= 0.
(19)
Defining Spjp the (J × J) matrix of the second derivatives of the market shares with
respect to retail prices whose element (l, k) is ∂
2sk
∂pj∂pl
, i.e.
S
pj
p ≡

∂2s1
∂p1∂pj
. . . ∂
2sJ
∂p1∂pj
... .
...
∂2s1
∂pJ∂pj
. . . ∂
2sJ
∂pJ∂pj
 .
We can write equation (3) in matrix form15:
Pw = IrSp(Ir − I˜r)
[
SpIr + IrS′pIr + (S
p1
p Irγ|...|SpJp Irγ)Ir
]−1
. (20)
Equation (20) shows that one can express the manufacturer’s price cost margins vector
Γ = w − µ as depending on the function s(p) by substituting the expression (20) for Pw
in (18).
As we say in section 3, we can consider like Sudhir(2001) only the direct effect of
wholesale price on retail price. In this case, the matrix Pw has to be equal to the following
14Rows of this vector that correspond to private labels are zero.
15We use the notation (a|b) for horizontal concatenation of a and b.
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diagonal matrix 
1 0 .. .. 0
0
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 1
. . .
...
... .. .. 0 0
0 .. .. 0 0

.
Here too,the price-cost margins of retailers and manufacturers can be computed under
this assumption.
The model can also be considered where retailers and/or manufacturers collude per-
fectly simply by modifying ownership matrices. In the case of perfect price collusion
between retailers, the price cost margins of the retail industry can be obtained by replac-
ing the ownership matrices Ir in (17) by the identity matrix (the situation being equivalent
to a retailer in a monopoly situation). Similarly, the price-cost margins vector for man-
ufacturers can be obtained in the case of perfect collusion by replacing the ownership
matrix If in (18) by a diagonal matrix where diagonal elements are equal to one except
for private label goods.
8.2.2 Two part tariffs
With resale price maintenance When w∗k = µk, the first order conditions
J∑
k=1
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ Gf
become in matrix notation:
IfSp(γ + Γ) + Ifs(p) = 0. (21)
In the case of private label products, the first order conditions
∑
k∈Sr
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ S˜r
become in matrix notation: for r = 1, .., R
(I˜rSpIr)(γ + Γ) + I˜rs(p) = 0 (22)
where I˜r is the (J × J) ownership matrix of private label products of retailer r.
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We thus obtain a system of equations with (21) and (22) where γ + Γ is unknown.{
IfSp(γ + Γ) + Ifs(p) = 0 for f = 1, .., F
(I˜rSpIr)(γ + Γ) + I˜rs(p) = 0 for r = 1, .., R
After solving the system (see appendix 8.3), we obtain the expression for the total price-
cost margin of all products as a function of demand parameters and of the structure of
the industry:
γ + Γ = −
(∑
r
IrS
′
pI˜rSpIr +
∑
f
S′pIfSp
)−1 (∑
r
IrS
′
pI˜r +
∑
f
S′pIf
)
s(p). (23)
Note that in the absence of private label products, this expression would simplify to the
case where the total profits of the integrated industry are maximized, that is
γ + Γ = −S−1p s(p) (24)
because then
∑
f If = I.
When wholesale prices w∗k are such that p
∗
k(w
∗
k)−w∗k−ck = 0, the first order conditions
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) +
∑
k∈{J ′,..,J}
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ Gf
become in matrix notation: for all f = 1, .., F
γf + Γf = (p− µ− c) = −(IfSpIf )−1
[
Ifs(p) + IfSpI˜(γ˜ + Γ˜)
]
where γ˜ + Γ˜ is the vector of all private label margins and I˜ is the ownership matrix for
private labels (I˜ =
∑
r I˜r).
In this case, profit maximizing strategic pricing of private labels by retailers is also
taken into account by manufacturers when they choose fixed fees and retail prices for their
own products in the contract. The prices of private labels chosen by retailers maximize
their profit on these private labels and the total price cost margin γ˜r+Γ˜r for these private
labels will be such that
γ˜r + Γ˜r ≡ p− µ− c = −
(
I˜rSpI˜r
)−1
I˜rs(p). (25)
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Without resale price maintenance
Then the first order conditions
∑
k
∂pk
∂wi
sk(p)+
∑
k∈Gf
(pk − µk − ck)∑
j
∂sk
∂pj
∂pj
∂wi
+∑
k 6∈Gf
(pk − wk − ck)∑
j
∂sk
∂pj
∂pj
∂wi
 = 0
become in matrix notation: for all i ∈ Gf
IfPws(p) + IfPwSpIfΓ + IfPwSp(p− w − c) = 0.
This implies that the manufacturer price cost margin is:
Γ = (IfPwSpIf )
−1 [−IfPws(p)− IfPwSp(p− w − c)] (26)
that allows for an estimate of the price-cost margins with demand parameters using (17)
to replace (p− w − c) and (20) for Pw. Remark again that formula (17) directly provides
the total price-cost margin obtained by each retailer on his private label.
8.3 Detailed resolution of system of equations
Generically we have systems of equations to be solved in the following form{
Af (γ + Γ) +Bf = 0
for f = 1, .., G
where Af and Bf are given matrices.
Solving this system amounts to solve the minimization problem
min
γ+Γ
G∑
f=1
[Af (γ + Γ) +Bf ]
′ [Af (γ + Γ) +Bf ]
which leads to the first order conditions G∑
f=1
A′fAf
 (γ + Γ)− G∑
f=1
A′fBf = 0
that allow the following expression to be found as solution
(γ + Γ) =
 G∑
f=1
A′fAf
−1 G∑
f=1
A′fBf .
51
8.4 Identification method for demand and supply parameters
Under a given supply model, for a given product j, at period t, the total price cost
margins γjt + Γjt can be expressed as a parametric function of prices and unobserved
demand shocks ut = (u1t, .., ujt, .., uJt): for example, in the case of two part tariffs with
resale price maintenance,
γjt + Γjt = −
[
(IfSptIf )
−1Ifs(pt, ut)
]
j
where [.]j denotes the j
th row of vector [.].
As marginal cost can be expressed as a function of the observed cost shifter Wjt,
unobserved product specific effects ωj , and unobserved shocks ηjt, we have
Cjt = exp(ωj +W ′jtλ)ηjt.
Identification of the price-cost margins relies on the assumption that instruments Zjt
satisfy
E (Zjtujt) = 0
and identification of the cost function relies on the assumption that
E(ln ηjtWjt) = E(ln ηjtωj) = 0.
Adding cost and price cost margin equations, a price equation can also be obtained
pjt +
[
(IfSptIf )
−1Ifs(pt, ut)
]
j
= exp(ωj +W ′jtλ)ηjt.
Identifying the parameters of this price equation would then require specification of the
joint law of unobservable shocks
(
ηjt, ut
)
. Thus, our two-step method has the advantage
of providing identification of demand and cost parameters under weaker assumptions. In
particular no assumptions need to be made on the correlation between unobserved shocks(
ηjt, ut
)
.
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8.5 First Stage of Demand Estimation
Dependent Variable pjt
Mineral water dummy*wage -0.0104
(-0.83)
Mineral water dummy*diesel price 0.00895
(6.98)
Mineral water dummy*plastic price -0.00824
(-2.32)
F(3,1980) test 30.77
Coefficients δj , γt not shown
t statistics in parentheses
Table 12: First Stage of Demand Estimation
8.6 Additional non-nested tests
Vuong (1989) Test Statistic
 H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 -21.13 8.28 -2.62 -7.53 4.36 -4.77 3.97 -14.88 -14.57 -14.15 -0.98
(13.58) (6.96) (10.18) (4.56) (6.87) (4.09) (5.62) (7.01) (6.05) (5.93) (8.21)
2 16.73 8.17 1.58 5.57 7.90 5.33 -11.66 -12.67 -11.54 0.19
(10.29) (5.78) (9.43) (8.87) (9.63) (10.44) (7.11) (6.41) (6.00) (12.20)
3 -13.77 -8.20 4.64 -8.11 4.18 -16.68 -14.74 -14.90 -0.60
(16.94) (7.28) (8.27) (7.00) (8.00) (10.18) (7.94) (8.15) (10.06)
4 -3.21 4.37 -0.64 4.86 -14.21 -14.12 -13.59 -0.55
(9.68) (8.57) (10.02) (11.74) (7.79) (7.39) (6.92) (12.90)
5 5.76 7.22 5.61 -1182 -14.89 -12.77 -0.44
(6.42) (4.72) (8.18) (5.27) (6.83) (5.72) (8.55)
6 -5.13 0.11 -9.12 -10.31 -9.73 -5.97
(6.72 (5.59) (6.40) (8.15) (7.24) (6.39)
7 5.01 -14.09 -16.21 -14.94 -0.68
(7.48) (7.01) (7.58) (7.00) (3.69)
8 -9.56 -10.24 -9.54 -4.61
(10.56) (13.36) (10.63) (5.05)
9 -5.04 -2.25 4.75
(6.89) (4.33) (5.83)
10 5.52 7.38
(6.72) (11.04)
11 6.11
(7.54)
Table 13: Results of the Vuong Test for the Random Coefficients Logit Model
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